A Case for Boring Banking and Re-Intermediation by Schackmann-Fallis, Karl-Peter et al.
WORKING PAPER SERIES
A Case for Boring Banking and Re-Intermediation
Karl-Peter Schackmann-Fallis/Horst Gischer/Mirko Weiß
Working Paper No. 18/2017
 Impressum (§ 5 TMG)  
Herausgeber:  
Otto-von-Guericke-Universität Magdeburg  
Fakultät für Wirtschaftswissenschaft  
D?? Dekan  
 
Verantwortlich für diese Ausgabe:  
Otto-von-Guericke-Universität Magdeburg 
Fakultät für Wirtschaftswissenschaft 
Postfach 4120  
39016 Magdeburg  
Germany  
http://www.?ww.???????/femm
Bezug über den Herausgeber 
ISSN 1615-4274 
K.P. Schackmann-Fallis, H. Gischer and M. Weiß 
1 
 
A Case for Boring Banking and Re-Intermediation 
 
Karl-Peter Schackmann-Fallisa, b / Horst Gischerc / Mirko Weißa 
 
 
I. Introduction: Will the change to re-intermediation and “boring banking” 
be successful? 
 
The global financial crisis put an end to the deregulation myth: the idea of a mostly self-regu-
latory financial system characterised by disintermediation was suddenly being questioned crit-
ically.1 Having been forced to assume liability, politicians demanded to be the decision-makers 
once again – on the one hand, in order to close regulatory gaps and on the other hand, to 
strengthen regulatory requirements in general, especially concerning own funds and liquidity 
reserves.2 
 
Disintermediated financial systems turned out to have structural weaknesses, which, in turn, 
lead to distorted incentives and misdirected allocations. Against this background, it was the 
broad political consensus to revert the banking system to its traditional functions, and to exten-
sively revitalise “boring” business models of deposit-based lending.3 This also implied ques-
tioning4 the assumption of a growing financial sector positively5 affecting non-financial activ-
ity. Accordingly, scepticism (re-)emerged that a very extensive financial sector6 ties up too 
many parts of economic resources – or deprives the real economy of them7 – and that, at a 
certain level, indebtedness is no longer sustainable. In addition, risks and competitive distor-
tions induced by “too big to fail” made their way into public awareness.8 The fiscal costs arising 
                                   
a German Savings Banks Association (Deutscher Sparkassen- und Giroverband [DSGV]), Berlin (Germany) 
b Executive Member of the Board of the German Savings Banks Association 
c Professor of Monetary Economics and Public Financial Institutions at Otto-von-Guericke-University Magdeburg (Germany); 
email: horst.gischer@ww.uni-magdeburg.de 
1 Cf. G20 Leaders’ Declaration, Washington DC November 2008 (G20 2008): “… 3. During a period of strong global growth, 
growing capital flows, and prolonged stability earlier this decade, market participants sought higher yields without an adequate 
appreciation of the risks and failed to exercise proper due diligence. At the same time, weak underwriting standards, unsound 
risk management practices, increasingly complex and opaque financial products, and consequent excessive leverage combined 
to create vulnerabilities in the system. Policy-makers, regulators and supervisors, in some advanced countries, did not ade-
quately appreciate and address the risks building up in financial markets, keep pace with financial innovation, or take into 
account the systemic ramifications of domestic regulatory actions…”. 
2 Cf. in particular G20 Leaders’ Declaration, Washington DC November 2008 (G20 2008), London April 2009 (G20 2009a) 
and Pittsburgh September 2009 (G20 2009b). For the implementation of Basel III in Germany, cf. in detail Deutsche Bundes-
bank (2013). 
3 Cf. exemplarily for the European civil society Finance Watch (2014: 68): “[T]he crisis did not show that all banks were too 
risky and that we consequently need more capital markets. It showed instead that some universal and investment banks were 
too risky and that we need more traditional banks. It is essential to distinguish between business models and promote those that 
have proven both more robust and more useful for the financing of the real economy”. 
4 Cf. among others Law/Singh (2014) or Cecchetti/Kharroubi (2015). 
5 Cf. summarised Levine (2005). 
6 Between 1980 and 2007, the value of global financial assets increased from USD14 trillion to USD 206 trillion and thus, in 
relation to the worldwide GDP, from 120% to 365% (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development [2013: 17]). 
7 Cf. also Tobin (1984). 
8 For the problem of an excessive risk taking induced by too big to fail cf. e.g. Barrell et al. (2010), Brewer/Jagtiani (2013), 
Marques et al. (2013). Reduced refinancing cost and the extent assumed implicit state liability resulting from too big to fail are 
addressed by e.g. Boyd/Gertler (1993), Soussa (2000), Fecht et al. (2008), Völz/Wedow (2009), Gandhi/Lustig (2010), Ueda/Di 
Mauro (2012), Siegert/Willision (2015). 
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from implicit fiscal guarantee for institutions considered too big to fail led to a deep scepticism 
in society vis-à-vis parts of the financial industry, and investment banking business models. 
 
This also explains why the so far common policy of creating major and globally active credit 
institutions as “national champions” (which might even have entailed consciously permitting 
lower regulatory standards to generate competitive advantages) was discontinued after the 
global financial crisis. At least during the acute period of the crisis, the G20 started pursuing a 
more distinctive international regulatory policy. At the same time, regulatory and supervisory 
competences underwent an extensive centralisation in the EU and, even more, in the euro area.   
This vast step of European integration not only includes a common set of regulations based on 
the Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR), but also – with the banking union in force – a 
centralised European supervisory institution (the Single Supervisory Mechanism [SSM]), a 
joint bank resolution financing (the Single Resolution Mechanism [SRM] with a Single Reso-
lution Fund [SRF]) and harmonised standards for the deposit insurance schemes.9 By means of 
banking union and European Stability Mechanism (ESM) Europe has de facto created a transfer 
union in the areas of financial market stabilisation and public finances. 
 
The impact of the wave of regulations implemented on the banking sector in the wake of the 
global financial crisis is extensive, and cannot yet be fully assessed. What we can already see, 
however, is a distinct deleveraging process in the banking sector. In general, equity capital has 
turned out to be the core restrictive factor in the banking business, thus tending to make balance 
sheet transactions more difficult. In addition, especially given the implementation of the Net 
Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR), long-term deposits are becoming increasingly important for 
banking operations – or conversely, long-term loans are becoming scarce. Generally, wide areas 
of the banking sector are clearly less profitable than before the global financial crisis. There are 
various reasons for this development, ranging from write-downs of non-performing loans and 
cost increases due to rising regulatory requirements, to lower earnings on the back of the con-
tinued global low interest rate environment.10 The general trend of digitalisation in the banking 
business combined with the emergence of new providers, notably in the areas of payment trans-
actions, as well as growing shadow banking activities, e.g. crowdfunding and credit funds, cre-
ate additional pressure on earnings.11  
 
With regard to organisational structures, re-regulation has led to a marked expansion in the 
areas of risk management and compliance. In fact, regulation imposes a higher minimum busi-
ness size upon banks, which has led to an extensive merger trend, especially affecting smaller 
credit institutions.12 Regarding Europe Alessandrini et al. (2016: 17) criticise: “Given that a 
                                   
9 Insights into the debates and necessities at that time are offered by e.g. Kotz (2009), (2011) and (2014). 
10 For empirical research regarding interest rate levels, yield curve and profitability of credit institutions, see e.g. Demirgüç-
Kunt/Huizinga (1999), Alessandrini/Nelson (2015), Borio et al. (2015). 
11 Cf. in detail German Council of Economic Experts (2015) and e.g. Rehm (2016). 
12 Over the last nine years (January 2008 to January 2017), the number of credit institutions in the European Union (EU 28, 
fixed composition) has declined by approximately 1,700 or 21%, and in the euro area (euro area-19, fixed composition) by 
approximately 1.400 or 22% (ECB Statistical Data Warehouse: Financial Corporations / Number of Financial Corporations). 
In Germany, the number of credit institutions has reduced by 326 between January 2008 and January 2017. At the same time, 
the average size of German cooperative banks increased by 71% (from 506 million EUR to 868 million EUR) and the size of 
Sparkassen from 2.3 billion EUR to 2.9 billion EUR, i.e. by 26% (Deutsche Bundesbank: Banking Statistics, table I.3). 
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large part of meeting regulation is a fixed cost, its burden falls proportionally more on small, 
local banks than large banks. While this asymmetric burden is recognized and in part corrected 
in the United States, it is instead almost ignored in the European Union, where the “one-size 
fits all” rule prevails… There is an apparent contradiction between the policy of banking con-
solidation and retrenchment and the objectives of financial stability and economic develop-
ment”.  
 
The United States and Europe have chosen different paths regarding differentiated regulation. 
While the EU implements a one size fits all approach with virtually no exceptions, the regula-
tory approach of the US differentiates (especially in its implementation of the Basel standards) 
between the size of banks,13 and aims to achieve heterogeneous market structures.14  In this 
context, Alessandrini et al. (2016: 6) note: “The last wave of regulation is relatively unfriendly 
to local banks, reflecting the position of regulators, especially European, that a consolidation of 
the banking system can lower systemic risk. American regulators, unlike their European coun-
terparts, appear to be convinced that variety of organisational forms in banking is worth pre-
serving”. European Union politicians obviously accept – or even aim for – induced structural 
changes on the banking market leading to less heterogeneity and larger entities. 
 
In this context, the question arises as to whether the process of disintermediation was only in-
terrupted briefly by the global financial crisis – whether driven by markets or political intention. 
Currently, international institutions such as the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
(BCBS), the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) or the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (IMF)15 as well as the European Commission16 are trying to revive secu-
ritisation, with the aim of disengaging the lending process from banks’ equity restrictions and, 
overall, to expand it. In 2015, BCBS and IOSCO introduced the “Criteria for identifying simple, 
transparent and comparable securitisations”: the number of securitisation levels is to be reduced 
and transparency increased, whilst securitising only the less risky receivables.17 In future, such 
so-called “qualifying securitisations” will have lower capital requirements than securitisations 
in general. Europe will probably introduce this with the release of the amended CRR II18. 
 
In principle, securitisation is an instrument which permits a broader diversification of risk. In 
order to prevent moral hazard in the context of securitisation, the CRR imposed a credit risk 
retention upon originators, amounting to 5% of the nominal value of the securitised receivables, 
or of the first-loss piece (Article 405 CRR).19 It is, however, debatable whether the asymmetric 
                                   
13 Cf. in detail for thresholds e.g. Tarullo (2016). 
14 Cf. Yellen (2014): “I believe a healthy financial system relies on institutions of different sizes performing a variety of func-
tions and serving different needs”. 
15 Cf. Aiyar et al. (2015). 
16 European Commission’s securitisation initiative adopted on 30 September 2015 comprises two legislative proposals: Pro-
posal for a Regulation Laying Down Common Rules on Securitisation and Creating a European Framework for Simple, Trans-
parent and Standardised Securitisation (STS) [COM(2015) 472 final] and Proposal for a Regulation Amending Regulation 
(EU) No 575/2013 [COM(2015) 473 final]. 
17 Cf. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision / International Organization of Securities Commissions (2015). 
18 COM(2016) 850 final (Proposal for a Regulation amending Regulation EU/575/2013) and COM(2016) 854 final (Proposal 
for a Directive amending Directive 2013/36/EU) 
19 In immediate response to the global financial crisis, Germany had imposed a credit risk retention of 10% (German Banking 
Act Section 18a, old version until July 2013), but lowered it in accordance with the CRR when the latter came into force. 
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distribution of information and the associated risk of securitising especially bad risks can be 
overcome with credit risk retentions of this scale. In addition, the weak points on the rating 
market continue to be unresolved. Europe has been trying to restrict possible misconduct with 
the introduction of the Credit Rating Agency Regulations I to III20 and corresponding supervi-
sion by the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), yet without finding a solution 
to the structural problems.21 
 
In view of the economic environment outlined above, the question arises whether the principal 
political objective aimed for after the global financial crisis – making the banking business 
“boring” again – has in fact been achieved. Or is it not a fact that many market players have 
relapsed into crisis-prone thinking patterns? With that in mind, it seems indispensable to discuss 
whether boring banking is an economically and socio-politically appropriate goal at all. 
 
The aim of the essay at hand is to do exactly this. For this purpose, chapter 2 will discuss the 
economical functions of banks, and debate whether a widely disintermediated financial system 
can work without friction. Following up on this, chapter 3 will evaluate the concepts of bank 
based and capital market based financial system from the perspective of providing loans to 
small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). In this context, this essay also deals with the po-
tential risk of a credit crunch for the real economy, and the experience Germany gained in the 
global financial crisis. Chapter 4 analyses the structure of the German banking market and the 
different business models from the perspective of boring banking. The essay concludes with 
economic policy recommendations deemed necessary to promote – or at least preserve – the 
business models of boring banking. 
 
 
II. Economic functions of banks and the sustainability of disintermediation 
 
II. 1. Reduction of asymmetric information and moral hazard 
 
Financial theory often assumes the ideal of a perfect capital market. This implies a market which 
is information-efficient, i.e. a market in which prices accurately reflect the information avail-
able. Accordingly, a financial contract would have to have a well-defined price at any given 
point in time – a price that applies to all market participants and to both sides of the market.22 
In such a state, the behaviour of savers and borrowers would not be influenced by financial 
intermediaries’ activities. In fact, the contracting parties on credit markets possess different 
information and the price does not reflect (or only partly reflects) all the material information; 
in general, the borrower knows more about his ability and his willingness to repay than the 
lender. 
 
                                   
20 Regulation EC/1060/2009 on Credit Rating Agencies (CRA I), Regulation EU/513/2011 on Credit Rating Agencies (CRA 
II), Regulation EU/462/2013 on Credit Rating Agencies (CRA III) 
21 Cf. in detail e.g. Stuwe et al. (2012) and Kotz/Schäfer (2013). 
22 Cf. Fama (1970), Bernstein (1992), Malkiel (1992). 
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One of the banking sector’s economic functions is to reduce asymmetric information concern-
ing the borrower, primarily by assessing the credit quality, and to limit moral hazard on the side 
of the borrower, i.e. the risk of a subsequent riskier use of funds.23 Economically, this is relevant 
to avoid capital misallocation, i.e. the use of (scarce) economic resources for unproductive in-
vestments. 
 
In this context, banks are better placed to overcome asymmetric information than securities 
markets, provided the following constellation is given:24 
 Local knowledge: A regionally focussed bank has an “informational edge” regarding the 
borrowers in the respective region. Thus, the degree of information asymmetry decreases. 
 Relationship banking, meaning the existence of a long-term business relationship including 
numerous banking transactions (within the scope of a primary banking relationship): With 
such a client relationship, the bank gains private information about the borrower’s financial 
situation and behaviour, practically ruling out asymmetric information.25 Undesirable busi-
ness developments and a possible misuse of loans can be detected in a timely manner. 
 
A primary banking relationship is also advantageous on borrower’s side, because the bank is 
often the one most likely to perpetuate the availability of credit, even in difficult times.26 Due 
to asymmetric and incomplete information, capital markets, on the other hand, often react ab-
ruptly (and in an undifferentiated manner) in case of signs of crisis or even driven by rumours, 
easily leading to the creation of boom-and-bust cycles. Overall, thanks to their unique ability to 
reduce asymmetric information, banks contribute to a reduction in market failure. 
 
 
II. 2. Risks inherent in the banking business, and how they are supposedly overcome by 
disintermediation 
 
Reducing asymmetric information is the core role of the banking sector, besides the transfor-
mation of lot sizes, maturities and risks as well as the preservation of a flowing macroeconomic 
income cycle.27 However, in this process, banks also assume significant risks which can ulti-
mately lead to a bank facing insolvency or a liquidity crisis. Thus, managing the risks linked to 
transformation functions is an important part of a bank’s internal risk management, as well as 
the starting point of banking regulation.  
 
Three key risk areas are relevant in this context: 
1. Interest rate risk occurs due to a mismatch between long-term contracts (with fixed interest 
rate) on the assets side, and short-term variable funding rates on the liabilities side. 
                                   
23 Cf. Diamond (1984) regarding fundamental research about positive effects on economic efficiency due to delegated moni-
toring done by specialised financial intermediaries in financial contract relationships.  
24 Cf. in detail Allen/Gale (2000) as fundamental literature and basis for several subsequent research, in particular regarding 
information asymmetries. 
25 Cf. e.g. Puri et al. (2011), Van Hoose (2010) and for previous research Hodgman (1960).  
26 Cf. e.g. Petersen/Rajan (1995) and Fried/Howitt (1980) for earlier discussion. 
27 For the following cf. in detail e.g. Mishkin (2016). 
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2. Funding risk arises because the bank constantly needs to find revolving funding for long-
term receivables. This is mandatory, given the fact that several assets can hardly be sold at short 
notice – and in any case not without losses.  
3. Default risk occurs especially where the credit quality assessment was unreliable, and mech-
anisms to counter moral hazard are missing after the approval of loans. 
 
A global disintermediation trend was seen between the 1980s and the outbreak of the financial 
crisis 2007/08, also in response to these risks inherent in traditional banking business. In this 
context, the term “disintermediation” is defined as a process replacing deposit-based lending 
with a straight use of securities markets, and hence, a shift towards a capital markets-based 
financial system.  
 
For the most part, the disintermediation process was supported by economic policymakers, and 
stimulated by a general market deregulation environment.28 From the perspective of economic 
theory, market failures were assigned only a petty existence, and the markets were deemed 
capable of regulating themselves. Politically, size and global activity were favoured and the 
creation of national champions was considered the only path in that direction. It appeared that 
a traditional banking sector – that is, one focused on deposit-based lending – was no longer 
needed: on the contrary, it appeared to be detrimental to financial market stability. On a tech-
nological level, disintermediation was enabled by the rapid development of information tech-
nology and promoted by a global interconnectivity of markets and an extremely fast information 
availability. On the academic side, the emerging financial engineering and the “art of securiti-
sation” seemed to have set the mathematical-statistical basis for a redesign of financial transac-
tions. 
 
In the wake of the disintermediation process, banks increasingly assumed a mere agent role 
between the client and the capital markets. From a client’s perspective, banks continued to 
function as lenders; however, they followed the originate-to-distribute model, quickly selling 
on receivables instead of keeping them on their own books as they had done traditionally. Ac-
cordingly, investment banking businesses gained importance within banks, as reflected on the 
income statement, with earnings shifting from the interest margin to commissions.  
 
Beyond the presumed benefits of market deregulation in general, from an economic perspec-
tive, disintermediation was linked to the thought that the opportunity of a broad risk diversifi-
cation might increase the risk-bearing capacity, via the capital markets. Corporate financing via 
capital markets also seemed superior as the latter were deemed more liquid, risk-friendlier and 
(almost) unlimited in quantitative terms. 
 
The first signs leading to doubts about the sustainability of disintermediation were various ac-
counting scandals, particularly the ones at Enron and WorldCom in the years 2001 and 2002, 
during which extensive assets, especially those held by private households, were lost. At the 
                                   
28 Cf. in detail e.g. Alessandrini et al. (2016: 3): “… we have had two peaks of financial regulation, the first in the wake of the 
GD [Great Depression] of the 1930s and the second after the GFC [Great Financial Crisis] of 2008-2009. Between these two 
peaks we have experienced a long wave of deregulation that started in the 1980s and progressed in the 1990s”. 
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latest, the global financial crisis in 2007/08 revealed the wrong incentives which had been cre-
ated in the course of the disintermediation process. Overall, it was obvious that the transfer of 
monitoring (associated with disintermediation) to rating agencies and investors had not worked 
at all. The combined system of securitisation, tranche splitting, an absence of credit risk reten-
tions, and investment vehicles, all provided the lending banks with the incentive to waive de-
tailed credit checks. This was the way in which the vast volumes of sub-prime loans could be 
extended, which ultimately caused misallocation of capital on a massive scale.  
 
When it became more and more obvious that the assets behind the securitisations had only a 
low value, the market collapsed. Additionally, multi-level securitisations created through 
tranching led to enormous intransparency. Ultimately, this led to market participants fleeing in 
droves, followed by a process of adverse selection: due to the risk premiums required by buyers, 
securitising good risks was no longer worthwhile. The bad risks remained, leading to a further 
loss of trust in the market and finally to its inoperability. With the loss of the securitisation 
option, the financial system based on disintermediation was robbed of one of its central func-
tional mechanisms.29 
 
Investing in money market funds, especially widespread amongst US private households, 
proved to be value preserving only to a limited extent. On the other side, corporate financing 
via issuing commercial papers – bought by these money market funds – proved unreliable. The 
year 2008 turned out to be a serious crisis year for the US money market funds, accompanied 
by financial shortages for real economy enterprises.  
 
 
II. 3. After the crisis: is waiving the banks’ traditional functions an option? 
 
As the global financial crisis showed at its peak, the fundamental problem of disintermediation 
is to adequately handle the associated increase of asymmetric information (and the consequen-
tial problems of moral hazard and adverse selection). It became obvious that the availability 
and reliability of information from financial accounting and reporting, as well as from ratings, 
were not given – yet they are key requirements for a functioning capital markets-based financial 
system.  
 
Specifically, the principle of extensive loan securitisation without sufficient retention of credit 
risk (or the first-loss piece) by the issuer resulted in insufficient pre-credit checks. This was a 
problem especially with subprime exposures in the US, and with so-called “Ninja” loans (no 
income, no job, no assets). Basic structural problems on the rating market, but also – in partic-
ular – the absence of liability for mistakes in assessment, were reasons for rating agencies’ 
failure to achieve a reliable risk assessment, and thus for their inability to replace the monitoring 
function carried out by banks so far.  
 
                                   
29 Cf. as well King (2016). 
8 
 
Consequently, the structures established by the disintermediation process were unable to ade-
quately reduce information asymmetry.30 Capital misallocation and a solvency crisis of institu-
tional financial market players were the results of insufficient (or sometimes completely miss-
ing) pre-credit checks of borrowers, or of the solidity of the investment. Likewise, the disinter-
mediation structures developed were inadequate for handling the funding risk incurred from the 
maturity mismatch between asset and liability side, leading to (potential) illiquidity in business 
models focused on extremely short-term capital market funding, or an excessive exploitation 
of yield curve spreads. In Germany, this was the case with Hypo Real Estate and other institu-
tions which had created investment vehicles as securitisation conduits – hence, business models 
which did not have a “boring” focus. 
 
Thus, the experience gained in the crisis demonstrates that – in the course of the progressing 
disintermediation, combined with a corresponding change in banks’ business models – an ade-
quate handling of risks was not realised. Risks mostly materialised in cases where business 
models had deviated from “boring banking” and a risk-sensitive governance; proof that tradi-
tional deposit-based lending business models – boring banking, in essence – is indispensable. 
Holding receivables on their own books sets the right incentive for banks to carry out thorough 
pre-credit checks of borrowers, or of the solidity of the investment project. The deposit-taking 
business acts as a stable funding basis for long-term receivables. 
 
Banks with a deposit-based lending business model firstly finance private households, espe-
cially the acquisition of consumer durables and residential property. From the perspective of 
economic theory, the banks thus enable the realisation of microeconomic intertemporal budget 
balancing. Secondly deposit-based lending business model finance small and medium-sized 
enterprises what is especially relevant as they are the key to economic value-added and high 
employment rates.31 In addition, SMEs counteract regional disparities and offer structurally 
weak regions the possibility of a catching-up process. Thus and in a next step, it is worth ana-
lysing lending to SME in lending. 
 
 
III. Lending to small and medium-sized enterprises 
 
III. 1. Bank financing vs. capital market financing for SMEs 
 
Enterprises can cover their borrowing needs – which they largely require to finance investment 
projects, or to pre-finance production – via bank loans, or by issuing debt securities (mainly 
                                   
30 The European real estate crisis taking place in Spain has been a result of previous faulty political structural changes. The 
statutory abolition of the Cajas’ regional orientation led to an unrestricted expansionism and ruinous competitive behaviour 
which, along with the lack of local knowledge in other regions, created credit exposures subject to extreme risks. 
31 In the EU-28 (2015), the SME sector contributes 57% of the real economy’s value added and 67% of employment (cf. 
European Commission 2016). For specific details on Germany, cf. e.g. German Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology 
(2013). 
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bonds)32 on the capital markets. Economically regarded, both alternatives are equivalent in prin-
ciple – yet the relevant benefits will differ according to the real economy market structure. 
 
For SMEs raising borrowings, bank loans exhibit clear advantages in terms of transaction costs; 
no external rating and no costly placing services are required. Bank loan borrowing benefits 
from lower disclosure obligations compared to a bond issuance (in some cases, especially fam-
ily businesses, public disclosure is even explicitly unwanted). Moreover, small volume borrow-
ings are possible.33 Given this scenario, it is almost exclusively larger companies which use the 
capital markets directly, because fixed costs arising by issuing bonds are more likely to amor-
tise.34 
 
Moreover, the presence of asymmetric information is particularly severe as far as capital market 
financings are concerned. Given the absence of direct communication channels, investors re-
spond directly to actual (or rumoured) difficulties a company might be facing. In some cases, 
their response might be exaggerated, in which case the yield spreads required would make it 
difficult for the company affected to overcome its weakness.35 In contrast, thanks to direct com-
munication paths, defined communication partners, and long-term business relations, bank 
lending provides better opportunities to overcome periods of economic distress – especially 
given the opportunity to renegotiate loans and to find flexible solutions.36 Thus, long-term bank 
relationships are very relevant for SMEs, because they may be facing phases of weakness more 
frequently, given their lower financial buffers available.37 
 
Beside this, capital market financings do not necessarily offer borrowing cost benefits: when 
comparing loan interest rates and capital market yields, one needs to bear in mind that such a 
gross comparison neglects the costs involved with capital markets financings (costs of the issu-
ing process as well as rating and reporting costs). It is also striking that even gross benefits 
depend upon the timing (cf. figure 1) – a factor which does not support planning reliability for 
companies. The predictability of capital market financings is further complicated by the fact 
                                   
32 Besides traditional exchange-traded bonds, borrower’s note loans and private placements play a role for corporate financing; 
meaning non-listed (long-term) bonds, accounted as a loan at cost and hold by institutional investors looking for long-term 
capital investments (insurance companies and pension funds). Other forms of debt financing include merchandise liabilities, 
bills of exchange, liabilities against affiliated companies, shareholder loans, or advance payments received. For a detailed 
empirical review, cf. Deutsche Bundesbank (2012). 
33 The average issuance volume of so-called SME bonds in Germany was 48 million EUR over the period from 2010 to 2015. 
Compared to this, the median borrowing of a corporate client of the Sparkassen amounted to 0.5 million EUR, which highlights 
the significant discrepancy in borrowing volumes (cf. Hauschild/Kral 2013).  
34 “The Best Practice Guide: Entry Standard for Corporate Bonds” (Deutsche Börse 2014) lists minimum recommendations for 
a successful bond issuance. It was published in response to bond losses and other distortions in the Mittelstand bonds segment. 
The report gives a cursory insight into factual minimum requirements and states among others that issuing companies should 
have minimum sales revenues of 100 million EUR (cf. ibid. 5). Hence, the vast majority of issuers of so-called SME bonds are 
not even covered by the Mittelstand definition. 
35 Such herd-like patterns induced by a strong orientation to the crowd – regardless of fundamental data – is one of the core 
findings of behavioural finance (cf. Tversky/Kahneman 1992). 
36 Cf. as well Deutsche Bundesbank (2012: 21): “As a result, long-term lending relationships, frequently with just one bank – 
known as the “house bank” – were the norm. This meant that banks in Germany, in contrast to capital providers with less close 
business relationships with enterprises, frequently had privileged access to information, enabling them to adequately assess the 
enterprise’s economic situation and development potential. This also had a positive effect on enterprises’ financing costs”. 
37 For a detailed discussion, cf. Schackmann-Fallis/Weiß (2014). 
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that enterprises are more exposed to interest rate risks, given the fact that capital market fi-
nancings tend to have shorter maturities than bank loans. Moreover, bond issuances always 
involve placement risk.38  
 
Figure 1: Loan interest rates versus capital market terms (gross comparison), Germany 
Source: Datastream; own representation 
 
 
III. 2. SME financings, local banks, rural areas and regional disparities 
 
Even though loan financing might be advantageous from an SME’s perspective, it also requires 
corresponding market structures on the supply side. Small to medium-sized regional banks ex-
hibit a different structure in their loan receivables compared to large banks, with the former 
showing a significantly higher share of SME loans. Moreover, the credit portfolios of large 
banks show a lack of exposures to peripheral and structurally weak regions. These findings 
have meanwhile been extensively substantiated in literature, based on econometric findings, 
together with causal analyses.39 
 
A key factor for the lending divergence between small and large banks is related to banks’ 
structural organisations. Both the individual institution’s degree of complexity as well as geo-
graphical and socio-cultural distances between prospective borrowers and credit decision-mak-
ers play a significant role.40 Especially when lending to SMEs, handicraft or agricultural busi-
nesses, soft information factors are of great importance. Yet such information and assessments 
are lost on the way between a local branch office and a centralised loan decision-maker – or 
                                   
38 In 2013, the difference between the volumes of SME bonds issued and ultimately placed amounted to 30%. The placement 
ratio is in particular low regarding issuing enterprises without well-known, established brand names (for details, cf. Scope 
Ratings 2013). 
39 Cf. e.g. Alessandrini et al. (2016) for a summarizing overview. 
40 Cf. e.g. Stein (2002), Alessandrini et al. (2005), Alonso et al. (2008). 
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they may not be conveyed at all. Moreover, any lending decision predominantly based on indi-
cators is impracticable for potential SME borrowers, given a lack of comprehensive accounting 
and formalised controlling documents. This means that centralised lending decisions are ex-
posed to a correspondingly high degree of actual informational asymmetry. Furthermore, per-
sonnel fluctuation is higher in the complex organisational structure of large banks; as a result, 
soft information generated locally will not be available for the long term.41 Reflecting the lower 
availability (and usage) of soft information factors, large banks generally show a lower relative 
share of SME loans, compared to the credit portfolio of all banks.42 
 
Obviously, given the same mechanism, the relative share of SME loans will decline following 
a merger of medium-sized banks, or the acquisition of a small bank by a larger institution.43  In 
this context, a merger or acquisition often causes the lower generation or use of soft information 
factors, materially driven by the geographical or socio-cultural distance between persons having 
client contact and those authorised to take credit decisions.44 Empirical data also shows that a 
decline in the share of SME loans in the overall credit portfolio will not necessarily enhance 
profitability of a merged bank. This is because a withdrawal from the SME business affects 
borrowers regardless of their credit rating.45 Accordingly, the information asymmetry in loan 
relationships – which increases with bank mergers – will render a market dysfunctional: supply 
and demand will not fully match, creating a corresponding deadweight loss.46 
 
Differences in the relative structure on the assets side of small versus large banks can also be 
explained by the fact that within large banks, the allocation of available own funds and funding 
to local branches is not necessarily driven by local credit demand, but (at least partially) by 
subjective, socio-cultural assessments of decision-makers at head office. Such decisions are 
mostly taken at the expense of structurally weak regions.47 
 
The bias towards the home country (or the region of the domicile) which can generally be ob-
served with large banks having functionally distant organisational structures has been docu-
mented in empirical literature, especially for the period following the global financial crisis. 
Corporate clients domiciled in regions where the respective bank is not headquartered were 
more affected by higher interest rates, lending restrictions, or even a credit crunch.48  This is 
partly due to the fact that banks with global or multinational operations respond to liquidity 
shocks with a disproportionate internal withdrawal of liquidity from peripheral regions, in fa-
vour of the bank’s residence.49 
 
                                   
41 Cf. for a detailed treatise Alessandrini et al. (2016). 
42 Cf. for empirical analyses e.g. Cole et al. (2004), Scott (2004), Berger et al. (2005), Uchida et al. (2012), Ogura/Uchida 
(2014). 
43 Cf. e.g. Strahan/Weston (1998), Bonaccorsi/Gobbi (2001), Focarelli et al. (2002). 
44 Cf. e.g. Mian (2006), DeYoung et al. (2008), Liberti/Mian (2009), Filomeni et al. (2016). 
45 Cf. e.g. Sapienza (2002), Degryse et al. (2011), Presbitero et al. (2014). 
46 Cf. Alessandrini et al. (2008). 
47 Cf. e.g. Scharfstein/Stein (2000), Landier et al. (2009). 
48 Cf. e.g. Giannetti/Laeven (2011), Popov/Udell (2012), De Haas/Van Horen (2013), Gambacorta/Mistrulli (2014), Go-
bbi/Sette (2015). 
49 Cf. e.g. Cetorelli/Goldberg (2012), Berrospide et al. (2013), Dekle/Lee (2015), International Monetary Fund (2015). 
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Likewise, a home bias is evident for Germany, associated with unstable lending during times 
of crisis, given the loan portfolios of foreign bank branches and of the German big banks 
(“Großbanken”) with centralised operations (cf. figure 2). In contrast, lending of regionally 
oriented Sparkassen and cooperative banks was stable, exercising a levelling function during 
the global financial crisis.50 Thanks to stability in corporate lending by regionally focused Spar-
kassen and cooperative banks, credit restrictions were markedly lower (and less volatile) than 
in the euro area in general.51  
 
 
Figure 2: Lending to domestic enterprises and self-employed persons (percentage change from the previous year), for selected 
banking market segments in Germany 
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank (Banking Statistics, table I.7b); own representation 
 
Broadly speaking, with a share of 46% the regionally orientated Sparkassen and cooperative 
banks form the basis of lending to enterprises and self-employed persons in Germany.52, 53 As 
a consequence of the specialised lending focus of small and medium-sized banks, empirical 
research has shown a positive effect of such a banking market structure on regional economic 
growth.54 Especially for Germany, Hakenes et al. (2015) find a positive effect of small and 
                                   
50 Cf. in detail e.g. Gischer/Reichling (2010). Cf. Behr et al. (2017) for an analysis on the stability in lending over business 
cycles. 
51 Cf. among others Puri et al. (2010). A credit crunch relating enterprises in the US is among others analysed by Lux/Greene 
(2015). 
52 Cf. Bundesbank Banking Statistics (tab. I.7a)): Lending to enterprises and self-employed persons in total EUR 1,347.5 bil-
lion, thereof Sparkassen EUR 378.1 billion and cooperative banks EUR 237.5 billion (end of 2016). 
53 A management survey of around 400 companies in the German financial sector conducted by the Frankfurt University’s 
Center for Financial Studies confirms the vast importance of regionally-oriented Sparkassen and cooperative banks in lending 
to small and medium-sized enterprises (Center for Financial Studies 2017): 
“The financial industry is in broad overall agreement (62%) that the three-pillar model of the German credit industry (commer-
cial banks, savings banks, cooperative banks) has proven effective… On the question of the respective importance of each of 
the pillars, over 40% of the survey respondents from the financial industry agree that savings banks and cooperative banks 
equally make the crucial contribution or at least an important one. Only 20% of the respondents regard the commercial banks 
as crucial… ‘The savings banks and cooperative banks are essential for the financing of German SMEs,’ Professor Volker 
Brühl, Managing Director of the Center for Financial Studies, interprets the results.” 
54 Cf. Lucchetti et al. (2001), Berger et al. (2004), Usai/Vannini (2005). 
13 
 
medium-sized credit institutions on the number of new business registrations, especially in 
structurally weak regions. 
 
Small or medium-sized banks with a regional focus stimulate regional information production 
and are therefore particularly relevant for financing the SME sector, and in mitigating regional 
disparities.55 The structure of the banking market therefore plays a significant role in achieving 
socio-political goals as well.56  Even though a bank-financed or capital markets-based financial 
system cannot be assessed in isolation, but only in relation to existing economic structures, 
dynamic interdependencies must not be ignored: if the strengthening of the real-economy SME 
sector is an economic policy objective, this requires suitable (bank-based) structures in the fi-
nancial system.57 
 
Anyone who questions the reliability of bank financing in Europe, citing developments in 
Southern Europe over the time of government debt crisis since 2010, fails to recognise that to 
a large extent, weak lending in those regions reflected supply restrictions due to regulation and 
deep recession. It was especially the high level of uncertainty associated with the Asset Quality 
Review, ahead of the ECB assuming banking supervision, which contributed considerably to 
reticence in new lending exposures. This was exacerbated by false incentives from monetary 
policy, which promoted exposures to (Southern European) sovereign bonds rather than corpo-
rate lending or corporate bond investments.58 The shortage in lending in Southern Europe was 
thus largely induced by regulation and economic policy, whereby the decidedly contractionary 
fiscal policy exacerbated the recession in the real economy – and hence, the loss of corporate 
credit quality. Lending only started to stabilise – and lending conditions return to normal – 
when regulatory uncertainty the economic recession have ceased.59 
 
 
  
                                   
55 Cf. Gehrig (2011). 
56 Cf. Hall/Soskice (2001) regarding the underlying debate in political economy about (historically caused) differences between 
various institutional arrangements, their social rationale and their contribution to economic success. 
57 Cf. in detail Schackmann-Fallis/Weiß (2014). 
58 Cf. in detail ibid.. 
59 Cf. European Central Bank (2016). 
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IV. The banking market in Germany: who is boring? 
 
IV. 1. Structuring the German banking market 
 
Various approaches are possible for characterising banks, and hence, the structure of a banking 
market: 
(a) Differentiation by the institutions’ geographical scope of activities, 
 
(b) Differentiation by the institutions’ client base and business focus, 
 
(c) Differentiation by the institutions’ legal form and commercial objectives, 
 
(d) Differentiation by the institutions’ size, 
 
(e) Differentiation by the institutions’ main field of activity, or by the scope of banking services 
offered, i.e. universal banks vs. specialised banks. 
 
In its statistics on the German banking market, Deutsche Bundesbank classifies institutions in 
a first step as universal banks or specialised banks. In a second step, universal banks are further 
broken down by their legal form, and specialised banks by their main area of activity. This way 
of structuring the German banking market is generally recognised, and is used for the following 
descriptions as well. 
 
Applying Deutsche Bundesbank’s classification, “commercial banks” (“Kreditbanken”) repre-
sent the so-called “first pillar” of the universal banking sector. “Commercial banks” comprise 
all banks established under private law and being privately owned. Amongst “commercial 
banks”, the four “big banks” (“Großbanken”) – Deutsche Bank AG, Deutsche Postbank AG, 
Commerzbank AG, UniCredit Bank/HypoVereinsbank – command a prominent position, with 
approximately 57% of aggregated total assets (end-2016). The so-called “second pillar” com-
prises institutions under public law – local “Sparkassen” and “Landesbanks” at Federal state 
level. The “third pillar” refers to the cooperative banking sector, comprising local cooperative 
banks and their central institution. The three pillars or segments differ in their legal form, as 
well as in their business focus and/or corporate objectives. 
 
In addition, Deutsche Bundesbank’s general classification covers specialised banks, which fo-
cus their activities upon individual types of banking business. This includes real estate banks 
(mortgage banks) specialised in commercial real estate finance (office and retail trade proper-
ties, housing properties) and funding their lending business via “Pfandbriefe” (German covered 
bonds). The specialised banking segment also includes German savings and home financing 
institutions (“Bausparkassen”), offering private home loans, as well as state-owned banks with 
a business development or promotion mandate.  
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Figure 3: Share of universal banks and specialised banks in aggregated total assets, Germany 
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank (Banking Statistics, table I.3); own representation 
 
At the end of 2016 (cf. figure 3), balance-sheet assets of all banks active in Germany totalled 
EUR 7,836 billion. Universal banks account for 77% of the overall market, with specialised 
banks accounting for the remaining 23%. With 40% of all bank assets, the four big banks and 
other commercial banks are the largest pillar of the German banking market. Sparkassen (EUR 
1,173 billion, or 15%) and Landesbanks (EUR 879 billion, or 11%) together form the second-
largest segment within the universal bank sector, together accounting for 26% of the overall 
market. With a share of 11% of aggregated total assets of all banks operating in Germany, the 
cooperative banking sector is the smallest segment within the German universal bank sector. 
 
 
IV. 2. The public-law banking sector in Germany and the concept of a financial services 
network 
 
Public-law credit institutions are an important element of the German banking market. This 
comprises Sparkassen as local institutions with a regional business focus as well as DekaBank 
Deutsche Girozentrale, which provides capital markets products and investment funds for Spar-
kassen’ customer business, and the Landesbanks.60 The latter are particularly active in business 
with larger SMEs, and also supplement the product range for Sparkassen’ corporate banking 
business – e.g. underwriting services, derivative hedges, large or syndicated loans, or interna-
tional banking services for corporate clients.  
 
                                   
60 For a detailed treatise cf. e.g. Civitas (2013) and Schmidt et al. (2016). German Sparkassen and US community banks are 
compared by e.g. Gischer/Herz (2016). 
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Sparkassen are established as public-law institutions, with the respective municipality acting as 
the trustee (“Träger”)61 – a function that does not imply ownership. Hence, municipalities can-
not sell a Sparkasse, or issue directions in terms of business policy. “Träger” are no longer liable 
for institutions’ debts, and are not obliged to provide financial support.62 However, municipal-
ities nominate a certain share of members in the Board of Directors (“Verwaltungsrat”). As 
such, they determine the fundamental principles of business policy and supervise the Manage-
ment Board, without having any direct operating influence upon the business policy adopted.63 
 
There are approximately 400 German Sparkassen (July 2017: 390), in the vast majority under 
public law and under municipal trusteeship.64 These Sparkassen were historically founded by 
municipalities, but are de facto now owned by themselves. Trustees may be towns, municipal-
ities or administrative districts, which is evident from the Sparkassen’s name. The business 
activities of the Sparkassen have a regional focus – being their respective trustee’s geographical 
area, especially with regard to the branch network and the corporate banking business, but less 
so in the private customer business.  
 
Sparkassen are credit institutions within the meaning of Section 1(1) German Banking Act 
(“Kreditwesengesetz [KWG]”) as well as Article 4(1) European CRR. Hence, they are subject 
to all German and European bank regulation requirements, and to supervision by Deutsche 
Bundesbank and German Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (“Bundesanstalt für Fi-
nanzdienstleistungsaufsicht [BaFin]”), and/or the European Central Bank (ECB). On average, 
a Sparkasse in Germany has total assets of EUR 2.9 billion (end-2016), ranging from Ham-
burger Sparkasse (EUR 44 billion) down to Sparkasse Bad Sachsa with only EUR 129 million.  
 
The Sparkassen’ main line of business is retail banking, i.e. deposit-based lending to private 
retail customers and SMEs, which may be supplemented by capital markets products, invest-
ment funds and international business (via the central institutions). Bank lending to public-
sector entities is less important, and predominantly directed at local authorities and public-sec-
tor enterprises. Due to the high volumes required and the virtual absence of information asym-
metry, higher government levels finance themselves nearly exclusively via the capital markets. 
 
A special feature of Sparkassen in Germany is their “public mandate”, under which they are 
committed to serving the local stakeholders (“öffentlicher Auftrag”).65 Consequently, whilst 
                                   
61 The concept of public sector institutions (“Anstalt des öffentlichen Rechts”), in lieu of (private) ownership, was established 
in 1931, following the Great Depression. Since then, German Sparkassen have no longer been dependent municipal institutions; 
municipalities were thus no longer able to exert direct influence, making it impossible to exploit Sparkassen in order to support 
public-sector budgets. 
62 Until 2001, “trustee institutions” (i.e. municipalities or Federal states) – as a backstop – had ultimate liability for debts of 
Sparkassen and Landesbanks in the event of illiquidity (so-called “guarantor liability” [“Gewährträgerhaftung”]). This was 
abolished in July 2001 due to European single market reasons. The transitional period expired in July 2005, covering liabilities 
with a maximum term up to the end of 2015. 
63 Cf. in detail e.g. Gischer/Spengler (2013). For a debate about corporate governance structures in the German banking market 
cf. Kotz/Schmidt (2017). 
64 Due to historical reasons, there are five Sparkassen in Germany, which are not bound to municipalities and not established 
as public-law institution, among others the “Hamburger Sparkasse”. Those so-call “independent Sparkassen” have been 
founded by socially involved private individuals at the end of the 18th and the beginning of the 19th centuries. Despite some 
differences in governance structures, the “independent Sparkassen” are obliged to the general public as well. 
65 Cf. as well Brämer et al. (2010). 
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Sparkassen are for-profit entities, they do not seek to maximise profits. Sparkassen have the 
specific mandate to ensure access to financial services for financially weak groups of persons, 
to promote savings and the creation of wealth (for example, by way of financial education in 
schools, etc.), to maintain a presence throughout their geographical area of business (including 
in rural areas) and, in particular, to safeguard the provision of loans to regional real economy 
enterprises (provided a sufficient financial soundness).66 Furthermore, Sparkassen act as spon-
sors for social and cultural projects in their region, and support the sports. 
 
Together with the Landesbanks and DekaBank, the Sparkassen form a financial services net-
work. Even though this network is called the Savings Banks Finance Group (“Sparkassen-Fi-
nanzgruppe”), it is a network of independent credit institutions and insurance companies, not a 
corporate group. A financial services network is a special form of cooperation between enter-
prises;67 other forms of such cooperation are a corporate group, a franchise system, or a strategic 
alliance. As a key difference compared to a corporate group, network members are legally and 
commercially independent (a “bottom-up” organisation) but concur in defined areas, and main-
tain a joint Institutional Protection Scheme (IPS) in accordance with Article 113(7) CRR. Co-
operation within the network is organised by regional associations and the German Savings 
Banks Association (“Deutscher Sparkassen- und Giroverband [DSGV]”) as the umbrella or-
ganisation – without any formal authority to issue instructions.  
 
Specifically, cooperation within the network relates among others to a joint brand (the red 
“Sparkassen-S”), joint IT solutions, and the bundling of back-office tasks, e.g. the implemen-
tation of regulatory obligations. Moreover, the Landesbanks supplement the product range of 
the Sparkassen. The concept underlying a financial services network is to use the benefits of 
centralisation without sacrificing the advantages of a decentralised organisation. The network 
allows the generation of economies of scale, for example in IT, brand building and maintenance, 
engineering bank management tools, or in product development. At the same time, the benefits 
of decentralised decision-making, client proximity and local expertise are preserved. This is 
particularly important in corporate banking with SMEs and craft enterprises. 
 
 
                                   
66 In this sense Sparkassen as credit institutions under public law can be understood as a specific institutional arrangement of  
strategic coordination in a coordinated market economy as categorized by Hall/Soskice (2001); it allows economic subjects to 
share information and to commit themselves credibly despite incomplete contracts.  
Nowadays and in the context of development economics, the institutional concept of regional oriented credit institutions – 
combined with the historically social idea of savings banks and cooperative banks – can be refound as microfinance and inclu-
sive banking. Fact finding analyses suggest several conditions necessary for successful microfinance structures in the today’s 
developing countries: addressing a broad range of private retail and SME customers, credit lending based on available savings 
deposits, and the combination of social responsibility and economic soundness. For this purpose, specific governance structures 
are necessary to avoid pure profit maximisation on the one hand and to restore the original institution’s objectives on the other 
hand. Moreover and to gain from economies of scale, an entering into forms of cooperation structures is needed (cf. Schmidt 
et al. 2016). Insofar, the historic idea of establishing savings banks and cooperative banks in the 19th century in Germany – 
offering financial services for a large range of private retail and SME customers – and the subsequent gradual development 
into genuine inclusive local financial intermediaries can be seen as valuable lessons for successful inclusive banking structures 
in developing countries (ibid..). 
67 The allowance to form a financial network organisation, including an institutional protection scheme according to Article 
113(7) CRR, is not limited to a certain kind of institutions’ legal structure; meaning a financial network is possible for institu-
tions under private law as well. Besides the Sparkassen, the cooperative banks in Germany form a financial network, named 
“Volksbanken Raiffeisenbanken Cooperative Financial Network”. 
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IV. 3. Lending structures in the German banking market 
 
In relative terms, the balance-sheet assets of all monetary financial institutions active in Ger-
many are roughly equivalent to 2.5 times German GDP. Which is low in international compar-
ison and straight denies a broad over-capacity on the German banking market (cf. figure 4).68 
Some European countries (including Cyprus, Ireland, Luxembourg, and the United Kingdom) 
show significant higher multiples.69 
 
 
Figure 4: Monetary financial institutions’ (excluding ESCB reporting sector) total assets (outstanding amounts at the end of the 
year) in relation to GDP, selected European countries 
Source: ECB (Statistical Data Warehouse, MFI balance sheets), Eurostat (GDP and main components); own calculation and 
representation 
 
Even though the size of the German banking market shows a below-average ratio to GDP, 
compared to other countries, the German financial system has traditionally been characterised 
by a strong influence of banks. The ratio of “non-financial corporation loans to the outstanding 
volume of corporate bonds” was almost nine times at the end of 2016, markedly higher than in 
the United States or the United Kingdom (cf. figure 5). Accordingly, Germany shows a dis-
tinctly bank-based corporate financing structure, especially by international comparison. 
 
                                   
68 Based on empirical evidence, academic literature (cf. Law/Singh 2014) assumes that any further increase in lending volume 
over and above a ratio of private-sector lending volume to GDP of between 90% and 100% has a negative impact on GDP 
growth. In fact, this would be an indicator for an “overbanked” economy. At 89%, the indicator for Germany would support 
the notion of Germany not being overbanked. Cf. lending of monetary financial institutions (excluding ESCB) to domestic 
enterprises and households (loans and securities), end of 2016: EUR 2,805.6 billion (Deutsche Bundesbank, Monthly Report 
Banking Statistics, table IV.1); GDP Germany, end of 2016: EUR 3,134.1 billion (Eurostat, GDP and main components). 
69 Flögel/Gärtner (2017) offer a comparison of banking market structure in Germany, Spain and the United Kingdom. 
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Figure 5: Ratio of non-financial corporation loans to outstanding amounts of debt securities issued by non-financial corpora-
tions, United States and selected European countries 
Source: UK Office for National Statistics (Economic Accounts, Non-financial corporations), Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 
(FRED Economic Data, Nonfinancial corporate business), ECB (Statistical Bulletin, table 2.4: MFI loans / table 4.2: Securities 
other than shares), ECB (Statistical Data Warehouse, Debt securities issued by non-MFI corporations in Germany), Deutsche 
Bundesbank (Banking Statistics, table 8: Lending to domestic enterprises); own calculation and representation 
 
The German loan market is characterised by a distinct prominence of long-term loans (defined 
as loans with an agreed term exceeding five years), which accounted for 78% of all loans on 
average during the period between 1999 and 2016. In fact, the dominance of long-term tenors 
even slightly increased further in recent years: at the end of 2016, 81% (EUR 2,042 billion) of 
outstanding loans to domestic enterprises and private individuals had a term of more than five 
years (cf. figure 6).  
 
Figure 6: Lending to domestic enterprises and private households, by maturity, Germany 
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank (Banking Statistics Database, Lending by banks [MFIs] in Germany to domestic enterprises and 
households); own representation 
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At 38%, Sparkassen and Landesbanks exhibit the largest share of long-term loans (cf. figure 7). 
The growing role of cooperative banks in long-term lending is visible as well: their market 
share in this segment rose from 15% in the first quarter of 1999 to 22% in the first quarter of 
2017.70 Long-term exposures or fixed-interest rate lending is extremely advantageous to bor-
rowers, since they provide the corresponding planning certainty. Conversely, the banking sector 
is very active in terms of maturity transformation. It is thus important, from a banking supervi-
sor’s point of view, to keep a close eye on funding risks and interest rate risks.  
 
 
Figure 7: Long-term lending to domestic enterprises and private households, shares of banking market segments, Germany 
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank (Banking Statistics, table I.6b); own representation 
 
Empirical evidence regarding transaction cost benefits of bank loans – especially for small and 
medium-sized enterprises – can be found by analysing the financing mix of Sparkassen’ corpo-
rate clients in detail (cf. figure 8). Small businesses (with annual revenues not exceeding EUR 
0.5 million) have a distinctly high degree (most recently 63% or 72% respectively) of bank 
loans in their overall borrowings. Conversely, the relative importance of bank loans is dimin-
ishing with increasing size of the enterprise: the share for larger SMEs (annual revenues not 
exceeding EUR 5 million) is approximately 30%. For large corporations (annual revenues 
above EUR 5 million) the share of bank loans in the overall borrowings is a mere 25%. Large 
companies are more likely to be able to bear the fixed costs incurred with bond issuance.  
 
                                   
70 Because of their regional business orientation (forced by the legal regional principle or induced by the member mandate in 
case of cooperative banks respectively), their refinancing structure using deposits and their specific governance, Sparkassen 
and regional cooperative banks in Germany show a highly distinctive degree of long-term lending. Long-term lending to do-
mestic enterprises and private households account for 54% of total assets (Sparkassen) and 54% (cooperative banks) respec-
tively; in contrast to only 15% of total assets (private commercial banks) and 12% regarding big banks (end of 2016; source: 
Deutsche Bundesbank, Banking Statistics Database, Lending by banks [MFIs] in Germany to domestic enterprises and house-
holds / Assets and liabilities by banks [MFIs]). Sparkassen and regional cooperative banks produce long-term financial means 
as a quasi-public good. 
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Figure 8: Share of loan liabilities in overall borrowings, by enterprise size (yearly turnover plus inventory holding in millions 
of euros), Germany 
Source: German Savings Banks Association (SME Diagnosis, mimeo); own representation 
 
To summarize: On the one hand, the low importance of direct capital markets financing reflects 
the German business landscape, with a distinct SME sector. Bank loans involve lower transac-
tion costs for SMEs. On the other hand, the nationwide presence of credit institutions with a 
regional focus provides stable house-bank relationships;71 there is thus no need to call upon 
other sources of external capital. 
 
 
IV. 4. Identifying boring banking: analysis of balance sheet structures  
 
Table 1 shows the aggregated balance sheet of all banks operating in Germany. The assets side 
is dominated by lending to non-banks, accounting for 51%, which in turn is broken down into 
81% book receivables (EUR 3,275 billion) and 19% (EUR 755 billion) securitized and other 
receivables. Lending to other banks account for 31% of aggregated total assets, illustrating the 
importance of the interbank market. 
 
Deposits from non-banks account for 45% of equity and liabilities of all banks operating in 
Germany, followed by liabilities to banks (22%), relating to funding via the interbank market. 
Whilst bearer debt securities are still important funding vehicles, accounting for just under 15% 
of equity and liabilities, their share has been declining over time. The non-risk-weighted equity 
ratio (Leverage Ratio) of all banks operating in Germany is 6%. 
  
                                   
71 Cf. Behr et al. (2013). 
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All banks (end of 2016) 
Assets Equity and liabilities 
 EUR bn. % of total 
assets 
 EUR bn. % of total 
assets 
Cash and central bank 
balances 
323.4 4.1 Liabilities to banks 1,729.0 22.1 
Lending to banks 2,420.8 30.9 Deposits from  
non-banks 
3,532.9 45.1 
Book receivables from 
non-banks 
3,275.1 41.8 Bearer bonds 1,131.9 14.4 
Other receivables from 
non-banks 
755.4 9.6 
Receivables from  
the derivatives portfolio 
651.6 8.3 Liabilities from the  
derivatives portfolio 
618.8 7.9 
Participating interests 119.9 1.5 Equity 489.7 6.2 
Other assets 290.1 3.7 Other liabilities 334.0 4.3 
Total assets 7,836.2 100 Total assets 7,836.2 100 
Table 1: Aggregated balance sheet of all banks in Germany (2016) 
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank (Monthly Report Statistics table IV.1; Banking Statistics, table I.1 / I.2); own representation 
 
Using the overall market as a reference, differences in the business models become evident. 
Whereas Sparkassen’ and cooperative banks’ balance sheet structures are strongly made up of 
non-bank business, lending to non-banks and deposits from non-banks count in big banks’ bal-
ance sheet about 30% only (cf. figure 9).   
 
 
Figure 9: Balance sheet structures of selected banking market segments in Germany in comparison (end of 2016) 
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank (Monthly Report Banking Statistics, table IV.2); own representation 
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Analysing the changes in time line, big commercial banks show a clear shift away from non-
banks lending (cf. figure 10), whereas the Sparkassens’ business model became even more non-
bank focussed (cf. figure 11). 
 
 
Figure 10: Balance sheet structures of the big commercial banks in Germany (1999 and 2016 in comparison) 
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank (Monthly Report Banking Statistics, table IV.2); own representation 
 
 
 
Figure 11: Balance sheet structures of the Sparkassen in Germany (1999 and 2016 in comparison)  
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank (Monthly Report Banking Statistics, table IV.2); own representation 
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Sparkassen (end of 2016) 
Assets Equity and liabilities 
 EUR bn. % of total assets  EUR bn. % of total assets 
Cash and central bank 
balances 
30.8 2.6 
(all banks 4.1) 
Liabilities to banks 130.4 
 
11.1 
(all banks 22.1) 
Lending to banks 188.0 16.0 
(all banks 30.9) 
Deposits from  
non-banks 
884.4 75.4 
(all banks 45.1) 
Book receivables  
from non-banks 
768.7 65.5 
(all banks 41.8) 
Bearer bonds 13.8 1.2 
(all banks 14.4) 
Other receivables 
from non-banks 
154.6 13.2 
(all banks 9.6) 
Receivables from  
derivatives portfolio 
0.04 0.0 
(all banks 8.3) 
Liabilities from  
derivatives portfolio 
0.03 0.0 
(all banks 7.9) 
Participating interests 14.5 1.2 
(all banks 1.5) 
Equity 101.2 8.6 
(all banks 6.2) 
Other assets 16.3 1.4 
(all banks 3.7) 
Other liabilities 43.1 3.7 
(all banks 4.3) 
Total assets 1,172.9 100 Total assets 1,172.9 100 
Table 2: Aggregated balance sheet of the Sparkassen in Germany (2016) 
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank (Monthly Report Banking Statistics, table IV.2, Banking Statistics, table I.3); own representation 
 
A detailed analysis comparing balance sheet structures of Sparkassen and all banks (figures in 
brackets) highlights the “boring banking orientation” of Sparkassen: At 79% of aggregated total 
assets, the Sparkassen (cf. table 2) exhibit a distinct and above-average importance of lending 
to non-banks (or, a below-average share, therefore, of lending to banks). 83% of lending to non-
banks are book receivables – traditional bank loans. Deposits from non-banks are the Spar-
kassen’ main funding source, accounting for 75% of aggregated equity and liabilities. Accord-
ingly, liabilities to banks and bearer bonds are clearly underweighted. Derivatives are virtually 
irrelevant for Sparkassen. The high, above-average unweighted equity ratio of 8.6% is striking. 
Overall, deposit-based lending to non-banks – the Sparkassen’ business model – is evident both 
on the assets side and in equity and liabilities. 
 
 
IV. 5. Profitability of boring banking 
 
Differences in the business models are reflected in the balance sheet structure as well as in the 
composition of the income statement. Across the entire German banking market net interest 
income is by far the dominating income component, yet its relative importance has declined 
over time in favour of net commission received.72 While this shift has been observed for years, 
it intensified in the course of the contemporary ECB zero interest rate policy. 
 
                                   
72 Cf. Deutsche Bundesbank (2016). 
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Besides the current monetary policy environment, the trend towards commission income has 
being argumentatively pushed by the IMF for quite some time, amongst other organisations, 
with the motivation of making the generation of income less dependent upon maturity transfor-
mation. However, this misses the point that commission income is subject to significant conse-
quential risks, especially legal risks. Moreover, given the moral hazard issues associated with 
pure selling activities, a widespread pushing commission income needs to be seen critically. 
Given such a development, the banking sector would be less involved in the various transfor-
mation functions – lot size, maturity and risk transformation; yet these functions would need to 
be performed elsewhere in the financial system, even though the banking sector has an edge in 
terms of specialisation in this context. Nonetheless, country-specific recommendations by the 
IMF also show differences in fundamental thinking: The financial system in continental Europe 
has traditionally been bank-based. Banks are traditional intermediaries, taking on counterparty 
risks and generating income from the interest margin. In contrast, the IMF’s fundamental con-
cepts tend to be biased toward the capital markets. 
 
 
Figure 12: Net interest received and net commissions received of selected banking market segments in Germany 
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank, “The performance of German credit institutions”, Monthly Report, September 2009 (37-66) 
and September 2017 (51-85); own representation 
 
Figure 12 breaks down net interest income and net commission income by the big banks, Spar-
kassen and cooperative banks, comparing 2008 data with 2016. Net interest income remains the 
most important source of income across all bank groups. Looking at relative importance, how-
ever, it is evident that the big banks derive a material portion of their income from commission-
based business, the importance of which has increased over time: in 2008, net interest income 
was 2.2 times net commission income – by 2016, this had declined to 1.9 times. In contrast, net 
interest income is more important for Sparkassen and cooperative banks, amounting to about 
3.5 times net commission income. Causes for this divergence are the structural changes the big 
banks underwent during the global financial crisis, strong increases in the lending business of 
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Sparkassen and cooperative banks, as well as fundamental differences in the respective business 
models.  
 
Net interest income is projected to decline over the next years, largely due to the prevailing 
low-interest rate environment. In this way, monetary policy itself might has turned into a risk 
factor for the stability of the banking system73, threatening the income-generating sources of 
traditional business models of deposit-based lending. Banks are thus forced to consistently 
charge negative interest rates on their liabilities side in order to maintain their interest margin 
or to expand their commission-based business – which would of course mean a departure from 
boring banking.  
 
 
Figure 13: Return on assets of selected banking market segments in Germany  
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank, “The performance of German credit institutions”, Monthly Report, September (several years) / 
DZ Bank Annual Financial Statement 2016; own representation 
 
The aggregate of net interest income and net commission income, plus net trading income and 
other income, minus administration and asset revaluation expenses, leads to net income before 
taxes. To analyse the long-term profitability of a bank or a business model, it is reasonable to 
analyse the ratio of net income before taxes to total assets (Return on assets [“ROA”]). 
 
Figure 13 illustrates bank net income before taxes over the period 1999 to 2016. Business mod-
els or banking groups which have turned out to be particularly profitable were cooperative 
banks and Sparkassen, with an average of 0.6% of total assets, as well as other regional banks 
(0.3%). Looking at the return on total assets, the big banks are far less profitable (0.07%); the 
central institutions of the financial services networks show a similar picture. The standard de-
viation provides additional insights: RoA of the big banks during the observation period (1999 
                                   
73 For more details on this discussion, cf. International Monetary Fund (2016) or Deutsche Bundesbank (2015). 
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to 2016) was particularly volatile, with a standard deviation of 0.4. This is attributable to the 
cyclical nature of investment banking and capital markets business, whereas the retail and SME 
business conducted by Sparkassen and cooperative banks clearly yield more stable results. 
 
V. Conclusions and policy recommendations 
 
Strengthening SMEs across the regions is a core concern of German and European economic 
policy. Besides bureaucratic burdens, taxation and social security aspects as well as society’s 
risk tolerance, this also encompasses the stability of financing facilities, and hence, banking 
regulation.  
 
Traditionally, banks have taken a central role in corporate financing in continental Europe. This 
is advantageous because long-lasting business relationships help to establish a special informa-
tional relationship, which in turn allows for the best possible assessment of corporate credit 
risk. Looking at Germany in particular, given the prevailing economic structure with a dist inct 
SME sector, bank loans have proven to be the more suitable form of financing, given transaction 
costs and corporate governance aspects. In contrast, capital markets-based financing would in-
volve corresponding publication and rating costs, would require corporate governance to focus 
on a shareholder value, and would evidently bring about losses of control for senior manage-
ment, which is mostly made up from the family owning the business. Hence, a stable banking 
market with a strong focus on real economy enterprises is of fundamental importance for Ger-
many in particular. 
 
Yet undifferentiated regulation, administrative requirements which impede SME lending to 
some extent, and a persistent zero interest rate monetary policy are currently relevant factors 
which threaten, or at least fail to support, the traditional business model of deposit-based lend-
ing. Unless banks charge negative interest rates on deposits, a long and drawn-out policy of 
zero (or negative) interest rates deprives traditional deposit-based lending business models of 
their interest margin, forcing institutions into commission-based business – a departure from 
the boring banking approach. 
 
However, from the perspective of the deposit-based lending business model, the regulatory 
framework needs to be seen critically. This relates to specific instruments, but especially to the 
undifferentiated overall approach. The regulatory framework created puts small and medium-
sized banks at a disadvantage: Firstly, systemically relevant banks still benefit from an implied 
state guarantee, providing them with cheaper funding costs whilst placing small and medium-
sized banks at a competitive disadvantage. Secondly, the undifferentiated regulation involves 
excessive costs for small and medium-sized banks, given the fact that regulatory costs are 
largely fixed administrative costs – not “too big to fail”, but “too small to comply”.74  
 
                                   
74 Cf. likewise Alessandrini et al. (2016: 5): “The uniformity of regulation penalizes local banks relative to larger banks because 
the implementation of complex regulation is to a large extent a fixed cost”. Cf. as well Feldman et al. (2013), Grammatikos/Pa-
panikolaou (2013), Koch (2013), Hackethal/Inderst (2015), Schackmann-Fallis et al. (2016). 
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In a second-round effect, such an asymmetric cost impact of regulation weakens SMEs and 
burdens peripheral or structurally weak regions. Moreover, lending to SMEs is being unneces-
sarily restricted, e.g. given specific instruments, such as the “Net Stable Funding Ratio 
(NSFR)”, the increasingly quantitative requirements for the loan approval process and growing 
reporting requirements. 
 
Another threat to the “boring banking” business model is the growing dominance of banking 
regulation based on a plethora of indicators. This approach prevents the inclusion of soft factors 
which are crucial for SME lending. On top of this, a strongly quantitative approach in regulation 
and supervision creates a false sense of security, which is blind towards new risk factors that 
might emerge. At the same time, market participants may consciously seek “workaround strat-
egies” – helping them to achieve formal compliance for business practices, which are in fact 
inappropriate. It would make more sense to implement supervision based on qualitative factors, 
with regulators monitoring business and (macro-)economic developments and responding on 
an ad-hoc basis – in line with the initial conceptional idea of Pillar 2 framework. 
 
Renewed political attempts to strengthen securitisation must be seen critically. It comes as no 
surprise that large banks and investment banks, backed by the expectation of low-risk commis-
sion income from underwriting and financial engineering, are supporting such initiatives. The 
political argument that securitisation would revive lending growth (since this would circumvent 
the restriction of banks’ limited own funds) appears to be contradictory: following the crisis, 
politicians endeavoured to strengthen banks’ equity position in order to enhance the buffer 
against unexpected losses. Using a securitisation initiative to circumvent this would counteract 
that very objective. It is also not persuasive that only high-quality assets would be securities 
this time – especially given that these would hardly generate relief in equity. Rather, it seems 
that players are ready to succumb to the belief that “this time, things are different”.75 Strength-
ening securitisation once again, as proposed within the framework of Capital Markets Union, 
would be tantamount to quickly forgetting historical experience, and testament to a seemingly 
inevitable belief in the superiority of capital markets. 
 
Overall, the present regulatory environment – especially in Europe – is inadequate for helping 
boring banking towards a full-scale breakthrough. On the contrary: regulation puts such busi-
ness models at a disadvantage. As such, regulators threaten to counteract their previous goal of 
returning banks’ business models to boring banking on a broad scale. The fact that politicians 
have once again returned to favour the ideas of securitisation and striving for size gives addi-
tional cause for concern.  
 
What is required instead is a review of bank regulation, both in terms of proportionality for 
small and medium-sized banks, as well as regarding potential restrictive effects upon corporate 
                                   
75 Borrowed from the title “This Time is different: eight centuries of financial folly” (Reinhart/Rogoff 2009). 
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lending. The US approach of a differentiating, two-tier bank regulation is economically ade-
quate.76 A similar approach – the Simple Banking Box – is also available in Europe and should 
be considered in the impending amendment of the CRR.77  
 
The Simple Banking Box should comprise all credit institutions that are not classified as 
“global” or “other systemically important institution” (cf. Article 113(2) and 131(3) Capital 
Requirements Directive). A differentiation based on systemic relevance would avoid having to 
introduce a further threshold on the one hand and encompass various dimensions that are rele-
vant for financial stability – size, complexity, interconnectedness, substitutability, and cross-
border activities78 – on the other hand. 
 
The purpose of the Simple Banking Box is not to lower standards across the board: the point is 
that not all rules have to be applied to all kinds of credit institutions to the same degree of 
complexity.79 Above all, administrative relief is required. Besides regulatory reporting, this re-
lates to requirements for organisational structures, external reporting, and risk management, 
remuneration and MiFID compliance; it also involves the scope of quantitative analyses as part 
of internal stress testing and the Pillar 2 assessment.  
 
Even though the recommendations made by the Basel Committee have traditionally been tar-
geting large institutions with cross-border activities, Europe has turned the concept of coordi-
nated regulation – which is correct per se – into a misconstrued “one size fits all” implementa-
tion. As a matter of principle, setting international regulatory standards is welcome, since this 
prevents an inefficient “race to the bottom”. Yet the problem with uniform international rules 
is that it is very difficult to consider special features of individual countries or regions, whereby 
international systems and market structures become ever more similar to each other. However, 
less heterogeneity makes shocks more symmetric and counteracts financial stability. 
 
Therefore, rules, which have been harmonised at an international level, should only be applied 
to large institutions with cross-border activities. The upcoming amendment of the CRR must 
be taken as an opportunity to correct the undifferentiated regulatory policy currently being pur-
sued in the EU, along the lines of the Simple Banking Box. In this way, regulation can be 
prevented from being a driver for mergers – whereby regulation itself would exacerbate the 
“too big to fail” issue and threaten “boring banking” business models. 
 
 
 
  
                                   
76 Cf. in detail Hoskins/Labonte (2015). 
77 Cf. Schackmann-Fallis et al. (2016). 
78 Cf. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2011) and (2012). 
79 Cf. Deutsche Bundesbank (2017): Small and medium-sized credit institutions (so-called Group II-institutions) in Germany 
are nearly completely complied with the new own funds and liquidity regulations according to Basel III.  
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